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INUM

COMPLETE EDITION

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INUM. Integrated National Governance Model

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From the Author

This concept has a history, set out in the three-volume The Continent.

Before proposing a new structure, I spent several years trying to understand why the previous ones had broken down, and this examination eventually became The Continent—an inventory of one hundred and twenty-nine years, compiled according to a single criterion: where precisely the machinery of the state failed and what, at that moment, happened to the person left alone before it.

At first the book was looking for someone to blame, but gradually it became clear that this search itself led to a dead end. In its chapters, the people built cities and factories, taught children, treated the sick, fought wars, restored what had been destroyed, and at times endured what, it would seem, no human being should ever have had to endure. The rulers, meanwhile, were entirely different: cruel and gentle, energetic and sluggish, educated and ignorant, sober and hard-drinking, sincere and cynical. The eras changed, as did the names of offices, the portraits on the walls, the official doctrines, and the words used to explain what was happening, yet the result too often proved similar. When, with different inputs, a system arrives again and again at roughly the same result, an engineer stops looking for an error in the inputs and begins examining the structure itself.

That was where the fundamental defect was found. Time and again, under the most varied authorities and the most varied slogans, the country assembled a machine in which the final decision remained with whoever was at the top, and consequently far too much depended on who precisely would get there. Tsar, general secretary, president, guarantor—the names changed, but the principle remained, because the structure itself rested on the assumption that a sufficiently good person would be at the top and would use the power received wisely. Sometimes such a person did indeed appear, sometimes not, but over the course of history this no longer made the decisive difference: good people did not last long enough, while a

system designed around their constant presence continued to operate as though there were no contradiction in this.

From this arose the question with which The Continent ends. Not the question of who should govern, because the country had answered it many times, each time hoping that it had now found the right person, the right class, the right party, the right form of appointment, or the right ideology, after which the next answer often cost more than the previous one. If historical experience teaches anything here, it is above all that the question should be asked differently: not who should receive enough power to put everything in order, but what no one should have the ability to do, regardless of surname, convictions, popularity, or the circumstances that brought them to the office at the top.

The final chapters of The Continent bring one hundred and twenty-nine years of such failures together into an eight-point technical specification. These are not wishes for a good state or a list of qualities that future leaders ought to possess, but conclusions drawn from breakdowns, each of which occurred repeatedly and in different historical circumstances. Emergency authority turned into a permanent right, bad news became safer to conceal than to report, the past was rewritten to follow a changed present, decisions were made at the top while the price of an error was paid by a person who had taken no part in making them, and at some point the error itself became so politically dangerous that acknowledging it was already harder than continuing to accumulate its consequences. That is why the requirements are derived not from an idea of what people ought to be like, but from observation of what they are actually like, and among the eight points the words “honest,” “wise,” or “worthy” do not appear once. A state structure that needs an honest and wise person at the top in order to function normally already contains a defect, for sooner or later a different person will be at the top.

The present document is an attempt to answer this technical specification in full. In The Continent, the model itself occupied several chapters and was shown only to the extent required to complete the historical examination, whereas here it is presented separately and taken apart

component by component, so that each can be considered, tested, and criticized independently of the others. The subjects are a resource model of the state, scenario modeling of the consequences of decisions, a public decision card, the separation of verifiable facts and public values, a mechanism for feedback and the correction of errors, protection against algorithmic dictatorship, the legal basis, the sequence of implementation, and, finally, a list of ways in which the proposed system itself could be broken or turned into the opposite of its original design.

The two books can also be read separately. The Continent is self-contained as a diagnosis, and this concept does not require the reader to work through the entire historical examination beforehand, but they were written as parts of one work, and the connection between them is quite simple: not a single substantial requirement in the present document appeared merely because it seemed reasonable to me to arrange the state that way. Behind every requirement stands a specific failure, and behind that failure—its own date, its own place, and a person who ultimately paid for it.

Three things must be stipulated at once, without which the text that follows can easily be misunderstood. This is not an ideology or a party program, because the proposed structure does not require the reader to take a particular position in advance on questions of property, economics, social justice, or a set of political convictions. Nor is it a design for the right ruler, because the whole of the preceding book was devoted precisely to the fact that there are not enough right rulers for any historical period of appreciable length, and a system that works well under a worthy leader and begins to fall apart under an unworthy one cannot be considered reliable. Finally, this is not about transferring power to an algorithm, since the choice of goals, priorities, an acceptable price, and public compromises must remain with people and the institutions they have created. A machine can calculate consequences, detect contradictions, preserve the memory of decisions made, show alternative scenarios, and prevent yesterday's data from being altered unnoticed to justify today's result, but the moment it receives the right to decide for itself what society should want, it ceases to be an instrument and becomes a new vertical

hierarchy of power, only this time with a processor at its summit instead of a person.

I am neither an official nor a legislator, and I am not proposing that tomorrow we should begin rebuilding the state according to this document. This is a blueprint that can be taken apart, tested, and subjected to an attempt to break it, by finding contradictions and places where the structure will not withstand an encounter with a real person, a real official, a real struggle for power, or a real crisis. It should be tested in the same way that The Continent tested previous systems: not limiting ourselves to the question of how everything is supposed to work under favorable circumstances, but finding out above all what will happen when circumstances turn unfavorable and someone tries to use the system's design in their own interests. We need to ask what will happen if a foolish person reaches the top, or, conversely, someone intelligent but unprincipled, if the majority is mistaken and the minority learns to manipulate that majority, if the input data prove false, if the algorithm begins to be adjusted to produce a result wanted in advance, and if, during a war, a crisis, or a panic, the familiar demand arises once again to switch off the restrictions briefly for the sake of saving the state.

That is precisely why I wrote the section on risks and honest objections myself and deliberately made it the most uncomfortable part of the document. A structure that looks convincing only as long as no one seriously tries to find a way around it is of no great value, so the task of this text is not to prove the infallibility of the proposed model, but to provide a sufficiently detailed blueprint on which a specific point of future failure can be indicated. If such a point exists, it is better to discover it on paper than after the system acquires power over human life.

The introduction to The Continent ended with the hope that the next time the urge arises again to abolish everything and start over, someone will have at hand at least a list of what usually breaks first. Now that list has been compiled, the causes of the breakdowns have been brought together into requirements for the structure, and what remains is to move from the

history of why the old machines failed to the blueprint of a machine that we must try to break before anyone decides to build it.

Part I. Integrated National Governance Model (INUM)

This material will be of interest to public figures, political institutions, the expert community, and the general public. It sets out the idea of the INUM system in sufficient detail and with sufficient clarity for it to be discussed, criticized, refined, and ultimately assessed as a real project for modeling government decisions, rather than as a slogan or a technological utopia.

The INUM concept describes an information and analytical model that brings together, within public administration, resource accounting, scenario modeling of the consequences of each decision, public justification, and the subsequent testing of forecasts against results.

The document is a conceptual synthesis (its methodological status is discussed in detail in Section 40 of Part II): the proposed architecture brings together principles and institutions, each of which has individually been tried in existing international practice in public administration, economic theory, and law—regulatory impact assessment (OECD), experimental legal regimes (for example, Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 258-FZ of July 31, 2020), federated data exchange (the Estonian X-Road platform), evidence-based program evaluation (J-PAL, Behavioural Insights Team), and institutional analysis of the governance of common resources (E. Ostrom)—but does not report on an empirical test of the system as a whole.

The document successively covers the resource model of the state, macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis, the separation of facts, forecasts, and values, mechanisms for transparency and feedback, defense and migration policy, financial regulation, regulatory and legislative practice, legal and institutional protection against the concentration of power over the system, a phased implementation roadmap, and an honest examination of the approach's limitations. It is

addressed to political institutions, the expert community, and the general public as a basis for further public discussion and refinement.

A Brief INUM Manifesto

Humanity has explored almost the entire planet, ventured into space, created artificial intelligence, and learned to work with enormous volumes of data. We model nuclear power plants before construction even begins, calculate the properties of new medicines before clinical trials, and create digital twins of aircraft, cities, and production facilities. Yet we still govern states almost blindly.

Every day, governments make thousands of decisions. They build roads, change the tax system, reform education and healthcare, allocate budgets, issue laws, and launch national projects. Most such decisions are made with fragmented information. Some government bodies hold data on finance, others on demographics, others on transport, and still others on healthcare. Each sees only part of the overall picture, whereas the state is a single system in which all processes are interconnected.

Even presidents are often unable to take all these interconnections into account simultaneously. The information underlying decisions inevitably passes through many levels of analysis, interpretation, and departmental priorities. As a result, such decisions are often shaped within the bounds of particular interests, while their actual impact extends to the economy, the social sphere, infrastructure, and quality of life as a whole.

INUM is not a new political ideology, and it does not propose replacing human beings with artificial intelligence. Nor is its task confined to the digitalization of government processes. The concept proceeds from the premise that the goals of society's development should be determined by people through existing political institutions. INUM merely provides a tool that makes the consequences of different decision options more understandable, measurable, and comparable.

At the heart of the concept lies a simple idea. Before a significant government decision is made, it should be possible to model several scenarios for its implementation, assess the resources required, identify potential risks, and forecast possible consequences. After

implementation, the results should be compared with the original forecasts, so that the state can understand the reasons for deviations and take this experience into account in the future.

Politics will always remain a space of human choice. But its consequences should no longer go without subsequent analysis.

The Five Principles of INUM

1. The state must see itself

The modern state possesses an enormous volume of data, but these remain scattered among departments. INUM brings them together into a single governance model that makes it possible to view the country as an interconnected system rather than as a collection of separate institutions.

2. Every significant decision must have a forecast

Any law, government program, or major infrastructure project must be accompanied by an objective assessment of possible consequences even before it is adopted. Governance should not rest on assumptions when consequences can be modeled and compared in advance.

3. Every decision must be tested by time

A forecast has no value in itself if it cannot be compared with reality. After a decision has been implemented, INUM compares the expected results with those achieved, allowing the state to learn from its own experience and gradually improve the quality of governance.

4. Technology must help people make decisions, not make decisions in their place

INUM does not replace political institutions or substitute algorithms for human choice. It merely shows the possible consequences of different scenarios. Society determines the goals, people make the decisions, and the system provides the knowledge needed for a responsible choice.

5. The state must remember

The history of governance is not only an archive of documents, but also accumulated experience. The most expensive mistake is the one that has to be repeated. INUM turns the results of past decisions into a constantly growing knowledge base, allowing the state to learn just as science, medicine, or engineering learns.

A Brief Description of the INUM Concept

Over the past hundred years humanity has learned to create and manage systems of incredible complexity. A modern airliner, nuclear power plant, spacecraft, or major industrial complex undergoes thousands of hours of modeling before construction even begins. Engineers calculate possible scenarios in advance, test the stability of structures, assess risks, and eliminate errors at the design stage. Today it is practically impossible to imagine creating a complex technical facility without a digital model.

At the same time, public administration continues to develop according to an entirely different logic.

Despite the rapid development of information technology, big data, artificial intelligence, and powerful analytical tools, most government decisions are made with fragmented information. Each department has its own statistics, its own performance indicators, and its own tasks. The consequences of practically any significant decision extend far beyond the remit of a single ministry.

For example, building a new highway affects more than the transport system. It changes property values, redistributes employment, and influences the environment, budget expenditure, business development, healthcare, and population migration. Similarly, changes in tax policy affect not only budget revenues, but also investment activity, entrepreneurship, the labor market, and the social sphere. The state is a single system, yet decisions within it are often assessed in fragments.

The result is a paradoxical situation. The most costly decisions, on which the well-being of millions of people and the country's development for decades ahead depend, are often modeled considerably less well than a new car, an aircraft, or even a household electronic device.

This does not mean that they are made unprofessionally. On the contrary, thousands of qualified specialists take part in preparing them. The problem lies in the absence of a single governance model that would make

it possible to assess the consequences of different scenarios in advance, take interconnections between sectors into account, and compare expected results with what actually happened.

The concept does not claim to replace existing political institutions and does not propose an algorithm that will make decisions in a person's place. Its task is considerably more pragmatic—to provide the state with a tool that makes it possible to see interconnections between processes, forecast consequences in advance, and gradually accumulate knowledge of which approaches to governance actually work and which lead to systemic errors.

If the twentieth century became the era of engineering complex technical systems, then one of the principal challenges of the twenty-first century may be the creation of an engineering of public administration—a system in which the most important decisions will rest not only on experience, intuition, and expert assessments, but also on objective modeling of their consequences.

What INUM Is

INUM is a unified information and analytical system supporting public administration, designed to model the consequences of decisions being made.

Its main task is not to replace established mechanisms of governance, but to supplement them with a tool that makes it possible to assess potential consequences before a decision is implemented.

At the foundation of INUM lies a unified digital model of the state, bringing together information on finance, demographics, the economy, infrastructure, transport, healthcare, education, natural resources, and other key areas. Instead of fragmented information systems, a unified data space is formed, reflecting the interconnections between different state processes.

Before any significant decision is made, the system makes it possible to construct several possible scenarios for how events may unfold. For each of them, the resources required, potential risks, impact on related sectors, expected social and economic effects, and possible long-term consequences are assessed.

INUM does not propose the “right” decision. The choice of goals and priorities remains exclusively with society and existing political institutions. The system merely provides objective information on the consequences to which each of the options under consideration may lead.

For all this, modeling is only one part of the concept.

An element no less important is continuous feedback. After a decision has been implemented, the system automatically compares the original forecasts with the actual results, identifies deviations, and analyzes the reasons for them. As a result, every new decision becomes a source of knowledge for subsequent ones.

Over time, the state gains the ability not only to store information, but also to accumulate verifiable experience in governance. A unified knowledge base gradually takes shape, recording which decisions proved effective, under what conditions they were made, and what consequences they produced in practice.

It is precisely here that the key difference between INUM and traditional information systems lies. Its task consists not only in processing data, but also in creating a mechanism for continuous learning in public administration. Whereas today the state mainly stores documents and statistics, INUM proposes moving to the accumulation of knowledge about the consequences of its own decisions, making governance more consistent, transparent, and grounded in experience.

Why This Matters

The history of public administration is the history of the emergence of new tools that gradually made the decisions being made more precise.

At one time states relied primarily on the personal experience of rulers and on oral traditions. Then written laws appeared, making governance more predictable and uniform. Later came the state budget, statistics, population censuses, and financial accounting systems. None of these innovations changed the nature of power, but each gave it more precise tools for making decisions.

In the twenty-first century digital technologies were added to them. States learned to collect enormous volumes of data, automated thousands of processes, moved many services into electronic form, and considerably increased the speed of information processing. At the same time, the principles of decision-making themselves changed much less than the technologies available to the state.

Today there is considerably more information, but not always more understanding of the interconnections between processes. Data exist in different information systems, departments continue to work within their own remits, and the consequences of most decisions are still assessed separately.

The next logical stage in the development of public administration may be a transition from governance based primarily on analysis of the past to governance capable of modeling the future. Not in order to predict events precisely, but in order to understand in advance the possible consequences of different courses of action, compare them with one another, and make better-grounded decisions.

INUM does not promise to build an ideal state. It does not eliminate political disagreements, remove leaders' responsibility, or replace human beings with artificial intelligence. Political choice always remains with people and existing state institutions.

But INUM is capable of doing one thing of fundamental importance—creating a mechanism of continuous learning for the state.

Every decision made ceases to be a one-time event. It becomes part of a common knowledge base in which original forecasts are compared with

actual results, the causes of deviations are identified, and experience is formed that can be used in the future.

This is a transition from governance based mainly on experience, intuition, and expert assessments to governance that gradually accumulates verifiable knowledge about the consequences of its own decisions.

If this task is accomplished, public administration will be able to develop in the same way as engineering, medicine, or aviation: not only through the professionalism of individual people, but also through the ability of the entire system to learn from its own experience.

0. Summary of the Concept

The modern state manages an immense volume of resources—the budget, land, infrastructure, natural wealth, labor resources, time, and perhaps the most valuable asset of all, citizens' trust. But these resources are managed not as a single system, but as a multitude of loosely connected circuits. Dozens of ministries, hundreds of departments, thousands of regional and municipal bodies make decisions every day, relying on their own data, models, and effectiveness criteria, which are often incompatible with one another. As a result, the state, taken as a single whole, has no integrated picture of itself.

INUM is an attempt to solve this problem not through yet another administrative reform, but through the creation of a unified information and analytical infrastructure for public administration.

At the foundation of the system lie five interconnected mechanisms for working with information.

First, INUM forms a constantly updated digital model of the state, bringing together information on the country's key resources—from budget flows and the condition of infrastructure to demographic, economic, and social indicators.

Second, the system makes it possible to model the consequences of governance decisions before they are made. Any significant initiative is considered not as an isolated directive, but as a scenario with measurable consequences: what resources will be spent, what population groups will be affected, what risks arise, what alternatives exist, and what each of them costs.

Third, every substantial decision is accompanied by an open card containing the goal, input data, assumptions used, scenarios considered, expected results, and criteria for subsequent evaluation. In this way the decision-making process becomes observable rather than hidden within departmental correspondence.

Fourth, after a decision has been implemented, the system automatically compares the forecast with the results achieved. This information does not disappear with a change of officeholder or political cycle, but becomes part of the unified memory of public administration, making it possible to accumulate experience, analyze errors, and gradually improve the quality of decisions being made.

Fifth, the accumulated history forms an objective professional reputation for government bodies and officials. The basis for assessment becomes not public statements and political rhetoric, but the ability to achieve declared results, use resources effectively, and fulfill their own commitments.

And for this reason it is fundamentally important to define the boundaries of the system.

INUM is not an artificial intelligence that makes decisions in a person's place. It does not replace state institutions, abolish political competition, or substitute algorithms for democratic procedures. It is not a system for assigning social scores to citizens or a unified personal data database. INUM does not answer the question of what goals the state should pursue. That choice remains with society and its political institutions.

The system's task is considerably narrower and at the same time considerably more important: to make the process of public administration itself measurable, transparent, and accountable. Society formulates goals. The state makes political decisions. INUM shows what resources the country possesses, what constraints exist, what consequences each possible option will entail, and how closely the result obtained corresponds to the original promises. Errors cease to be a matter of political memory and become part of institutional knowledge that can be used in making subsequent decisions.

The present document sets out the architecture of this concept in detail. It examines the composition and structure of state resources, methods of building a digital model of the country, mechanisms of scenario modeling,

principles of transparency and public oversight, a possible technical architecture, the legal foundations, and stages of implementation.

Particular attention is given to limitations and risks. Any system that concentrates information and influences decision-making can potentially become an instrument of abuse. That is precisely why mechanisms for protection against the concentration of power, independent audit, openness of algorithms, and public oversight become one of the central questions of the concept. Without answers to these questions, such a system could become not a tool for improving the quality of public administration, but a source of new, more technologically advanced, and less visible arbitrary power.

1. Introduction. Why the State Needs INUM

1.1. A state that does not see itself

Let us take a perfectly ordinary day in the life of a modern state. The Ministry of Finance is preparing next year's budget on the basis of a macroeconomic forecast. The transport department is deciding to build a new road, analyzing traffic flows. The Ministry of Health is assessing whether a district hospital needs to be retained, on the basis of bed occupancy statistics and the costs of maintaining it. Regional authorities are approving the construction of a new residential neighborhood in accordance with the master plan. The tax authorities are proposing changes to tax policy, assessing the impact on the collection of budget revenues.

Each of these decisions is made by professional specialists. Each rests on data, economic calculations, and current legislation. Each looks entirely rational when considered within the boundaries of a particular department.

The problem arises where the boundaries of departmental responsibility end.

The new road will change land values, transport accessibility for settlements, the area's attractiveness to investors, and the distribution of the population. All this will, in turn, affect the workload of the district hospital, demand for schools and kindergartens, the volume of tax revenues, and expenditure on utilities and engineering infrastructure. In a few years, it is precisely these changes that will determine whether the original choice proves successful or, conversely, creates a chain of new problems.

For all this, the official making the decision to close the hospital generally has no transport model of the region. The designer of the new road rarely takes a long-term demographic forecast into account. The bodies

approving residential development often lack a complete picture of the condition of utility networks, social infrastructure, or future budget commitments that will arise once the new neighborhood is put into use.

As a result, the state makes a multitude of locally correct decisions that together may lead to a result that is suboptimal for the system as a whole. Each participant in the process conscientiously optimizes their part of the system, but practically no one is responsible for the consequences for the system as a whole.

This cannot be explained by a lack of professionalism among individual officials. On the contrary, most such decisions are made by competent people within the limits of their authority and on the basis of the information available to them. The cause lies in the very architecture of public administration, which historically was built on a departmental rather than a systemic principle. Responsibility is divided among organizations, while the consequences of their decisions spread far beyond administrative boundaries.

It is precisely this gap between local rationality and the result for the system as a whole that constitutes one of the key problems of modern public administration. And it is this task that the INUM concept attempts to address.

1.2. The data exist, but do not talk to one another

The paradox of the modern state is that today it possesses more data than ever before in its history. Practically every sphere of public life is already reflected in digital systems. Tax authorities know about the incomes of individuals and organizations. Cadastral services keep records of real estate. Pension and social funds hold information about the employment histories of millions of people. Medical information systems reflect morbidity indicators, requests for medical care, and the provision of healthcare resources in the regions. Energy companies record actual electricity consumption, while transport systems track road congestion, travel routes, and passenger flows in near real time.

At first glance it may seem that with such a volume of information, public administration should become ever more precise and well-grounded, but in practice the opposite happens. The quantity of data grows considerably faster than the ability to use them for decision-making.

The problem lies not in the absence of information, but in the fact that it remains divided among a multitude of independent information systems. Each was created to solve its own tasks, uses its own classifications, its own data models, different update intervals, and different levels of detail. Some systems are oriented toward financial accounting, others toward statistical observation, and others toward operational management. Even when the same objects are involved, they may be described differently, making automatic matching an extremely difficult task.

Added to this are organizational and legal restrictions. Obtaining information from another department often requires an official request, approval, and subsequent processing of the data received. Sometimes exchange is impossible not because of legal requirements, but because the information systems themselves were never designed to work together. Formally the necessary information exists, but in practice using it within a single analytical process proves extremely difficult.

The result is a paradoxical situation. The state already possesses practically all the information needed to make well-grounded governance decisions, but is unable to see it as a single whole. While data are collected, cleaned, matched, and reconciled among different departments, time passes. Yet the decision has to be made today. In actual practice, therefore, it often rests on incomplete information, expert assessments, political compromises, or an intuitive understanding of the processes taking place.

Thus the key problem of modern public administration is no longer data collection, but the ability to bring the data together into a unified system of knowledge that makes it possible to see interconnections between processes, assess the long-term consequences of decisions being made, and move from managing separate departments to governing the state as a single system.

1.3. The methodologies are closed, and therefore distrust is inevitable

There is also another, less obvious problem. Even in cases where the necessary data have been collected and are available, it is far from always clear how they turn into a specific governance decision.

Practically any significant step by the state rests on one system of calculations or another. Methods for evaluating the effectiveness of government programs, formulas for allocating intergovernmental transfers, criteria for selecting investment projects, models for forecasting budget revenues, or rules for setting funding priorities—all these are sets of assumptions, coefficients, and algorithms on which the allocation of resources and the choice of government policy ultimately depend.

But these calculations themselves often remain internal documents of individual departments. They may be known to a limited circle of specialists, partially published, or entirely unavailable for external analysis. As a result, society sees the final decision but has no opportunity to trace the logic that led to this particular result.

This has several consequences at once. Above all, it becomes practically impossible to verify whether the decision was actually made according to the officially announced criteria or whether its content was influenced by circumstances not reflected in the documents. But there is another problem, no less important. Even if the decision is professional, well-grounded, and fully consistent with the established methodology, the absence of an open description of the methodology itself inevitably undermines trust in the result. When the logic of decision-making remains hidden, society begins to doubt not only the correctness of the calculations, but also the motives of those who used them.

The transparency of public administration is therefore determined not only by the availability of input data. It is no less important to make observable the models, rules, and assumptions themselves that connect data with the decisions being made. As long as this connection remains

hidden, it is impossible to assess fully either the quality of the decision or the grounds for responsibility for its consequences.

1.4. The citizen remains a spectator rather than a participant

For most citizens, a government decision exists already in its final form. A road will be built or the project abandoned, a district hospital closed or funds allocated for its modernization, a tax rate changed, a new measure to support business introduced, or budget expenditure redistributed. The decision itself becomes public, while the process by which it takes shape generally remains hidden.

Society rarely has an opportunity to see which options were considered, why this particular scenario was chosen, what data were used during preparation, what models were applied to assess its consequences, and what alternatives were rejected. But something else matters even more: after a decision has been implemented, an open comparison of the promised results with what actually happened is almost never carried out. The forecast that served as the basis for adopting it fulfilled its function at the moment the document was approved, after which it often ceases to be a subject of public discussion.

As a result, public debate inevitably finds itself deprived of the most important part of the information. Some are inclined to assume that government bodies possess all the necessary information and that their decisions should therefore be considered well-grounded in advance. Others, conversely, perceive the absence of transparency as evidence that the real reasons for decisions differ from those officially stated. Both positions arise for the same reason—the absence of an opportunity to verify how a decision was made and how closely its final results corresponded to the original expectations.

That is why the question of transparency in public administration cannot be reduced to publishing documents or statistical reports. It is no less important to make the entire life cycle of a governance decision

observable—from the input data and alternatives considered to the evaluation of results after implementation. Only then can public discussion rest not on trust or distrust, but on verifiable facts and accumulated experience.

1.5. Errors are not remembered

One of the most serious consequences of the fragmentation of public administration has been the absence of a fully developed institutional memory of decisions made and their consequences.

Practically any major government decision is accompanied by a forecast of expected results. It is assumed that an investment project will deliver economic growth, a new road will increase transport connectivity within an area, a support program will create jobs, and a change in tax policy will increase budget revenues. At the same time, after the work has been completed, the original forecast often ceases to be the subject of systematic analysis.

If the expected result was not achieved, information about this generally remains in individual reports, materials of oversight bodies, or the professional memory of the project's participants. The officials responsible move to other areas of work, leaders change, departments are reorganized. A few years later a similar decision is made in another region or in another sphere of public administration, but a mechanism rarely exists that would automatically compare the new initiative with the experience of previous projects and show which assumptions proved mistaken before.

Of course, states are capable of accumulating experience. It is passed on through administrative culture, professional communities, scientific research, the activities of oversight bodies, and specialists' personal experience. But such a mechanism inevitably depends on particular people, organizational continuity, and the preservation of expert knowledge. When personnel change, departments are reformed, or

priorities shift, a significant part of this experience is lost or ceases to be used in preparing new decisions.

INUM proposes making the memory of government decisions part of the infrastructure of governance itself. Each decision must preserve its connection with the forecast on which it was based and with the actual results obtained after its implementation. This sequence—**"forecast → decision → result"**—becomes not an element of the organizational culture of individual departments, but a mandatory characteristic of the entire system of public administration. As a result, experience ceases to depend on the memory of particular people and turns into continually accumulating institutional knowledge, available in the preparation of every new decision.

1.6. What INUM changes

If we bring together what has been said above, we can see that the INUM concept attempts to answer five fundamental problems of modern public administration.

The first is departmental fragmentation. Instead of a multitude of independent information circuits, INUM proposes a unified digital model of state resources. This is not a matter of concentrating power in one center or subordinating all departments to a single governing body. On the contrary, each department retains its powers and responsibility, but nevertheless begins to work with a common picture of the state's condition, rather than only with its own part of that picture.

The second problem concerns incompatible formats. It is proposed to solve it not by creating a single database, but by introducing common standards for information exchange and mandatory interoperability of government information systems. Each department continues to be responsible for the reliability of its information, but these data become part of a unified information space and can be used together with data from other government bodies.

The third problem lies in the closed nature of the methodologies on which decisions are based. INUM envisages that calculation models used to allocate resources, forecast consequences, and evaluate the effectiveness of government programs must be open to independent scrutiny. This does not mean that every decision automatically becomes correct, but makes it possible to render the logic underlying it transparent.

The fourth problem concerns the position of the citizen. Today society most often encounters only the outcome of a decision that has already been made. In the INUM system, every significant governance decision is accompanied by a public card containing its goal, the data used, the scenarios considered, the justification for the option chosen, and the criteria for subsequent evaluation of the result. In this way, not only the final choice but also the process of preparing it becomes the subject of public discussion.

Finally, the fifth problem is the absence of institutional memory. INUM makes it mandatory to preserve the connection between the forecast, the decision made, and the actual consequences of its implementation. Every forecast is sooner or later compared with the actual result, and the experience gained becomes part of the official history of the decision and is used in preparing subsequent projects.

None of the principles listed changes the nature of politics itself. The state remains a system in which people understand public interests differently, argue about goals, reach agreements, make compromises, and bear responsibility to citizens for the choice made. INUM does not propose replacing this work with algorithms. Its task is considerably more modest and at the same time considerably more important: to make the process of government decision-making observable, verifiable, and grounded in accumulated experience, rather than only in current circumstances and the institutional memory of particular people.

2. The Goals and Principles of the System

Before moving on to a description of INUM's architecture, it is necessary to define the principles on which the entire concept is built. They are neither recommendations nor wishes. They are fundamental constraints to which any implementation of the system must be subject—regardless of the technologies used, the level of development of artificial intelligence, or the particular features of the state's organization.

It is these principles that define the boundary between INUM and other possible models of digital governance. Without them, the system could turn into an instrument of total administrative control, a centralized data repository strengthening the power of individual departments, or yet another closed government platform that merely automates existing processes without changing their essence.

Each of them should therefore be regarded not as a description of desirable properties of the system, but as a constraint whose violation means that INUM ceases to be itself.

The first principle can be formulated as **unity without the centralization of power**. The state needs a unified picture of what is happening, but does not need a single center for making all decisions. INUM brings together information, models, and methods of analysis, but does not aggregate political powers. Ministries, regions, and municipalities retain their own remits, responsibility, and right to make decisions within the law. The system merely ensures that behind each of these decisions stands an understanding of interconnections and long-term consequences. Unity of information must not mean the concentration of power.

The second principle is **the separation of facts, forecasts, and values**. One of the most dangerous features of modern analytical systems is the gradual blurring of the boundary between objective information, probabilistic assessments, and political preferences. INUM is obliged to